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THE NATURAL, THE ARTIFICIAL, AND THE HUMAN: HISTORY OF SELF-DENIAL AND THE INTEREST OF HUMAN SAFETY

Abstract: *The ancient distinction between φύσις and νόμος survives today in the differentiation between human (natural) intelligence and artificial intelligence (AI), though transformed by major conceptual shifts in the history of philosophy. The meaning of “nature” has evolved from self-originating and self-movable being to a phenomenally constructed domain of external experience, while the “artificial” has expanded from mere craftsmanship to the broader sphere of what is in general produced, constructed, or technologically generated to the basis of the constructed nature itself. At the same time, the very notion of human nature blurs the boundary: if the human being is itself natural, then the products of human creativity appear human-natural, complicating the basic distinction. Contemporary constructivist and post-structuralist theories have gone further, interpreting both nature and human intelligence as products of unconscious or discursive construction. In such frameworks, the natural–artificial distinction becomes illusory, and AI appears merely as a derivative*

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construct of an already self-constructed human being. Yet this theoretical erasure of the natural undermines essential dimensions of human self-understanding and opens space for anti-human practical consequences. In contrast, a humanological perspective emphasizes the human being as the bearer of a fundamental interest of human safety, understood as the existential effort to preserve and ennoble its own existence and well-being. From this standpoint, the natural–artificial distinction has phenomenological and pragmatic necessity: it expresses a basic structural differentiation within human existence itself. The aim of this paper is to clarify and justify this distinction anew, particularly in relation to the ontological difference between human and artificial intelligence.

Keywords: *natural vs. artificial, human nature, artificial intelligence, constructivism, humanology, interest of human safety, ontology of technology*

1. Introduction

The distinction between *φύσις* and *νόμος*, established already in Antiquity, has, albeit in altered form and through various thematic permutations, persisted into the present in the differentiation between *human* or *natural* intelligence, on the one hand, and *artificial intelligence* (AI), on the other. Yet over the course of the history of philosophical thought, the concept of *nature* has undergone several radical transformations, both conceptual and referential, and these have likewise left the concept of the *artificial*, that which is conventional, produced, or constructed, far from unchanged.

At its core, this distinction has always concerned the source or origin of the existence and essence of the phenomena we encounter in the world. On one side stands what is *human* (νόμος, τέχνη, ποίησις), and on the other what is *natural* (φύσις), understood as the *non-human* in the sense of *that which arises and exists independently of human powers*. Yet the picture is complicated by the discourse on *human nature* and the human beings in the *state of nature*, which significantly loosens, and even calls into question, the rigidity of this distinction. For if the human, as one among other natural beings that itself possesses a nature in the sense of an essence, is also part of nature, then it would seem that the products of human activity are likewise natural, or rather *human-natural*.

The distinction can be partially reinforced by presupposing a radical difference between human nature and nature seen as the totality and inner determination of all other non-human beings and artefacts. This presupposition acknowledges that the concept of nature is no longer univocal and that its meaning varies from context to context; yet it does not resolve the issue but rather further complicates it. For now, in addition to the need for a conceptual articulation of the basic difference between the natural and the artificial, there arises the need to differentiate the natural from the human-natural.

However, the course of the history of philosophical thought has also encountered another, inverse possibility, namely, that *naturalness* as such, whether of the human being or of other entities, may itself be called into question, that is, presented as artificial or false, as an *as-yet-unrevealed artificiality*, a construct, and indeed a human one. According to this inverted standpoint, the

human being would be a ‘product of his own labor,’² that is, his own construct, akin to the products of his activity and creativity, from art, craftsmanship, industry, technique, and technology to the products of imagination or conceptual thought. Such positions go further still, holding that the entire (to us known) world is a human construct, whether linguistic, social, or of whatever kind.³

Within such theoretical frameworks, the distinction between natural and artificial intelligence proves illusory: so-called ‘natural’ or human intelligence itself turns out to be artificial, that is, the result of an unconscious self-construction, while what has hitherto been designated ‘artificial’ intelligence becomes simply doubly derived, *a construct fabricated by a temporally older construct*.⁴

² In this respect, Marx is indeed a Hegelian ‘turned upside down’. The thesis of human being as self-produced is a fundamental thesis of Hegel’s *Phenomenology of Mind*. Hegel sees in human labor the point at which the slave (or servant, which is the more precise translation), as the subordinate self-consciousness, attains its next, higher form of consciousness, for through labor, through the working on and shaping of matter, it builds and forms itself in return. Through labor, therefore, the human being shapes and perfects not only the object of labor but also himself. This is an important insight on which Hegel insists in the *Phenomenology*, specifically in the chapter on the dialectic of the servant and the master. Marx relocates this thesis from the spiritual plane of self-consciousness and its historical development into the sphere of society, that is, into the domain of economical structures and relations as the material foundation and guiding thread of the development of self-consciousness and of cognitive interest.

³ More on the Kantian origin of this conceptual turn will follow below.

⁴ See in (Romčević 2025).

The elimination of the concept of natural from theoretical framework and common consciousness results in the elimination of a distinctive human dimension in our understanding and self- understanding of the world. Such operations on the discursive level imply, at the empirical level, practical consequences in the form of anti-human intentions and practices.

However, in a humanological approach to philosophy and the social sciences, what is at stake is *the interest in human being*. *Existentially*, in the sense of a concern for the survival of the being which thematizes itself in the effort to disclose its own existence so as to improve and ennoble it, not abolish it; and also *scientifically-theoretically*, not only because every cognitive interest presupposes, as its very condition, the preservation of the knower, that is, the human being, but also because the human is the theoretical object of its undertaking. For this reason, the intention of the present work is once again to pose the question of this fundamental distinction. More precisely, it undertakes an examination of the possibility of a phenomenological-hermeneutic, as well as pragmatic, legitimization of the natural-artificial distinction.

2. History of the Concept of Nature

2.1. Concepts of Nature in Antiquity

The history of philosophy begins with the thematization of *φύσις* as the common essence of all that exists. It was first conceived as *ἀρχή*, both in the temporal-material sense of a *beginning and source from which all phenomenal beings came into existence and*

form, and in the logical-ontological sense as *that which always determines them*. Almost all works of the Pre-Socratic or the proto Pre-Sophist philosophers⁵, according to the reports of the doxographers, bore the same title *Περί φύσεως* ('*On Nature*'). Aristotle collectively referred to these philosophers as 'physicists' (*φυσικοί*), and attributed to them, or rather, reproached them for, a materialistic-reductive understanding of nature.⁶

Despite all the development and differentiation of the concept of nature among the Pre-Sophists, it unfolded along more or less a single trajectory, and it is with the Sophists that a new layer of meaning for the term emerges, along with the formation of the antithesis between φύσις and νόμος.⁷ Before them, φύσις and νόμος were not opposed concepts; it was assumed, both by the Greek populace and by philosophers, that human νόμος was established by the gods and aligned with φύσις.⁸ The Sophists, however, examined nature from an

⁵ The radical break in the history of Greek thought, before Socrates, was made precisely by the Sophists, whose discursive strategy provoked Socrates' turn toward philosophy far more than the thought of the physicists, as Aristotle later named them.

⁶ Here, we refer to Aristotle's critique that the thought of the physicists consists in an attempt to explain nature by appealing to no more than two causes: the material and the efficient. Setting aside, for the moment, the question of how well this characterization applies to the Eleatics, the Pythagoreans, and one Heraclitus, Aristotle captures the general direction of their thinking quite accurately.

⁷ See more in W. K. C. Guthries *The Sophists* (1971).

⁸ "Human laws (*nomoi*) are sustained by the one divine law' said Heraclitus (fr. 114, vol. 1, 425), and for Hesiod (*Erga* 276, echoed in the myth of Protagoras, Plato, *Prot.* 322 d) 'Zeus has laid down' a 'law for all men,' that unlike the beasts they should possess justice" (Guthrie 1971: 55).

openly human-centered perspective, placing it in binary opposition to νόμος, understood as human creation, convention, and the non-essential, particularly in the context of moral and political (Guthrie 1971: 55). Nature is left in the darkness of the unknown, serving as a point of reference for the continual questioning and delegitimization of all human νόμος as merely customary, contingent, arbitrary, insignificant, ultimately false, and relative.

The two most significant uses of the term νόμος among the Sophists are: „(i) usage or custom based on traditional or conventional beliefs as to what is right or true, (ii) laws formally drawn up and passed, which codify ‘right usage’ and elevate it into an obligatory norm backed by the authority of the state. The first was the earlier use, but was never lost sight of, so that for the Greeks law, however much it might be formulated in writing and enforced by authority, remained dependent on custom or habit“ (Guthrie 1971: 56–57)⁹. The antithesis φύσις–νόμος in Sophist discourse operated on these levels:

“1. Discussion of religion turned on whether gods existed by physis—in reality—or only by νόμος;

2. of political organization, on whether states arose by divine ordinance, by natural necessity or by νόμος;

3. of cosmopolitanism, on whether divisions within the human race are natural or only a matter of νόμος;

4. of equality, on whether the rule of one man over another (slavery) or one nation over another (empire) is natural and inevitable, or only by νόμος;” (Guthrie 1971: 57–58).¹⁰

⁹ Addition in the brackets are authors.

¹⁰ Atheism, ideological constructivism, political-moral relativism, cosmopolitanism and internationalism, as well as equality, are the fundamental characteristics of the left and of contemporary anti- or post-philosophical authors, revealing the Sophists as their intellectual forerunners.

Provoked by such developments, Socrates emerges, who, viewed together with the teachings of Plato and Aristotle, delivers a strong counterstrike to the Sophistic tendencies toward relativism and skepticism, introducing a third layer of meaning of nature, namely human nature. The highest achievement of ancient thought, which bequeathed a lasting legacy to all of humanity, particularly the humanological approach, lies in this effort. It is an endeavor both for the philosophical-scientific treatment of the human being and for the practically attainable betterment of human life and experience.

In Plato, *φύσις* in the later Aristotelian sense is certainly not fully developed, but it is certainly grounded. Plato explicitly addresses the concept of nature in the dialogues *Cratylus*, *Phaedo*, and *Timaeus*. When Plato uses the term *φύσις*, he often speaks of it as synonymous with Ideas (ἰδέα) viewed as essences of particular beings, which is especially emphasized in *Cratylus*, where it is suggested that names (ὄνομα) refer to nature, that is, *φύσις* (which is conceived as stable and eternal in opposition to Heraclitus' interpretation). The dialogue that approaches an more close to the Aristotelian understanding of *φύσις* is ofcourse *Timaeus*, which discusses the *cosmos*, understood as *order*, for Plato there describes how the Demiurge brings the chaotic world into order through the Ideas (a motif from Greek myths, where the cosmos arises through the ordering of chaos). In *Phaedo*, Socrates speaks about generation, destruction, and being (it is not entirely clear whether he refers to existence (εἶναι) or existent beings (τὰ ὄντα), but it can be assumed both in some way, so we will here

simply say ‘being’) in the second ‘voyage,’ or immediately before it. This is the dialogue to which Aristotle explicitly refers in his critique of the Ideas, stating that in *Phaedo* Plato asserted that the Ideas are both the efficient and formal causes of things, a claim Aristotle subjects to criticism.¹¹

Whether Heidegger was right or not in claiming that “Aristotle’s *Physics* is a hidden, and therefore never sufficiently studied, fundamental book of Western philosophy,” it is certainly true that Aristotle’s concept of nature appears as the first thoroughly developed and, for the subsequent history of philosophical thought, decisive foundation (Heidegger 2003: 217).

For Aristotle, the concept of nature is above all *movement* (κίνησις). Aristotle is the first to discover that movement is the fundamental way of being. Φύσις is thus one of the causes (αίτιον–αιτία), as that which makes a being what it is.

“Furthermore, φύσις is the ἀρχή of κινήσεως” (Phys. 192b13–15), that is, the source and principle inherent in natural beings themselves, responsible for motion in the full range of its meanings for Aristotle, including change of place, increase and decrease, growth and decay, as well as alteration. Heidegger further traces the course of Aristotle’s thought: “If we consider all these overlapping ‘appearances’ as kinds of movements, we gain insight into their fundamental feature, which Aristotle designates with the word and concept μεταβολή. Every movement is a change of something (εκ τινός) into something (εις τί) ... However, the essence of the Greek-conceived μεταβολή can only be grasped when we take

¹¹ For the more than insightful and constructive advices, discussions, and suggestions regarding the philosophy of Plato, I am deeply grateful to my colleague Nemanja Katić, student in Ancient philosophy at the University of Munich.

into account that in change something previously hidden and absent is revealed ('emergence' and 'breaking forth') ... 'for the Greeks, movement as a *way of being* (*Sein*) has the character of coming into presence'" (Heidegger 2003: 223).

Thus, for Aristotle, the concept of φύσις is explicitly polysemous, and he employs it in this multiplicity without attempting to reduce it to a single meaning. For him, nature signifies:

1. The same as οὐσία¹², the individual essence of a thing in general, that which exists in itself, that is, the fundamental-determining mode of being.
2. Furthermore, 'the Being (*Sein*) of beings, specifically that being which is beforehand seen to have the character of κινούμενον-*a*, a being in motion' (Heidegger 2003: 237). That is, the name of a 'kind' of essence, the essence of naturally existing beings, specifically those that possess the principle of movement (in all four senses: change of place, growth, alteration, and decay) in themselves. Therefore, every spontaneously arising, self-moving being is natural.

¹² In Aristotle, the schema of the categories is recognized as the primary sense of being, and the primary category in relation to all the others is the first category, οὐσία (substance). Substance represents the sense of 'being' as being in itself, existing independently or self-sufficiently, and at the same time serving as the ὑποκείμενον of those beings that are not independent in their existence but require a subject (*Cat.* 2a11), namely all other categories of genus, species, qualities, quantities, relations, and so on. Substance is closest to the notion of simply or merely being, yet it earns its logical-ontological primacy through the characteristic of self-sufficiency, whereby beings characterized in this way of being are recognized as metaphysically fundamental entities and as the conditions of possibility for all dependent beings (*Cat.* 2a34).

3. Accordingly, φύσις is the ἀρχή of the movement of that which moves by itself.
4. Finally, φύσις is the self-manifestation of a being into appearance (εἶδος) (*Phys.* 193b18) (Heidegger 2003: 261).

Heidegger ultimately emphasizes (Heidegger 2003: 268-269): “Because φύσις, in the sense of the *Physics*, is a kind of οὐσία, and because οὐσία itself, in its essence, originates from a primitively projected φύσις, being is thereby endowed with ἀλήθεια, and the presence in the openness of the ἰδέα (Plato) and of the εἶδος κατὰ τὸν λόγον (Aristotle) is revealed as a characteristic of οὐσία; therefore, for Aristotle, the essence of κίνησις becomes intelligible as ἐντέλεια and ἐνέργεια.”

If the artificial is primarily understood as that which is non-natural, but not contra-natural, rather that which owes its existence and structure to human activity, then human νόμος, τέχνη, ποίησις, and also πόλις, in short, all human creations, stand in opposition to nature. However, when nature is understood as the inner essence of a being, then these same things are indeed natural, but now in the sense that they derive from, and are in accordance with, human nature, as human essence, as the Greeks understood it.

The natural, in the sense of self-originatedness, stands in opposition to the products of the human, for these would not exist without human activity, decision, and so forth. However, opposed to the natural can also stand the contra-natural, which most often carries a normative negative meaning in terms of various moral deviations or behaviors. Such moral judgment, however, presupposes the idea of some human nature as substantial, thus at least

in some sense constant and eternal, and normatively positive in itself. For example, the judgment of homosexuality as immoral and/or pathological presupposes heterosexuality as natural and moral, whereas Aristotle's judgment on the naturalness of the institution of slavery presupposes a judgment on a substantial difference of human natures in terms of character: between those capable only of self-rule and rule over others, and those of a servile disposition on the other side.

Thus, for the Socratics, man is certainly a naturally existing being, distinguished at the apex of the ontological hierarchy by the possession of speech (λόγος) and intellect (νοῦς), as well as by life within a political community (πόλις). Yet this is still understood as natural, that is, arising from and in accordance with human nature. Here, for the first time, an idea is clearly articulated—an idea that certainly predates the emergence of philosophy itself and, in its various subsequent variations, will not be abandoned until the Christian notion of man as the Image or Icon (Εἰκόνα) of God.

2.2. Christian Shift

In the Christian worldview,¹³ that is, in Greek metaphysics permeated by Christian dogma and faith,

¹³ Heidegger is mistaken when he claims that, because in the Christian view human nature is understood as having been given already in the act of divine creation as free and thus “left to itself,” and thereby also exposed to the possibility of “the destruction of the

nature is above all creation, that which is created by the Lord and, as such, good in itself, yet fallen as a consequence of humanity's original sin.¹⁴ Furthermore, nature continues to a God-given essence of the whole of creation, of the human being, and even of God Himself, with the distinction that creation is entirely knowable, human nature only partially, while the divine nature is almost wholly unknowable,¹⁵ except for what He has revealed to us, whether directly or through divinely inspired persons. The divine nature consists in personhood (ὕπόστασις), and as the image of God, the

human being through passions," it follows that this nature, from the Christian perspective, "must be suppressed," that it is something that "ought not to exist" (Heidegger 2003: 214). Human nature is indeed exposed to corruption through freedom, but Christ's teaching did not aim at the destruction of human freedom for the sake of cleansing from sin and passion; quite the contrary, it aimed at the affirmation of true human freedom, that is, of human nature as given from the beginning for deification, through the free overcoming of sin and passion. For the human being is not by nature sinful and passionate, but free, whereas sin and passion, and consequently death, are the result of the freely chosen original sin. Freedom, being left to oneself as the condition of the possibility of sin, is not thereby a reason for its self-annihilation of man; such a view belongs rather to trans- and post-humanist conceptions.

¹⁴ See the Holy Bible, *Genesis*.

¹⁵ "In the course of the debates concerning the nature of God, specifically, how God can be both One and Triune, the Christian concept of personhood was originally established. The answer reached was the following. God is, namely, *one in essence* (οὐσία), yet also Triune, because this one and identical essence is possessed by all three Persons, that is, *Hypostases* (ὕποστασις/πρόσωπον). These three Persons (the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost) exist in an indivisible unity of one and the same essence. The Hypostasis, however, now ceases to denote the essence itself and instead signifies the way of being of the essence" (Zizioulas 2009: 108).

human being shares this ontological characteristic, in a certain or partial, though not identical, way. Thus, *the Christian concept of human nature is grounded in the concept of person*.¹⁶ The human person is composite, yet its structure differs from that of the divine. The human person, as the totality of its being, consists of corporeality, of a soul inseparable from the body, of spirit, and of character. In the structural unity of these elements lies personhood as the distinctive human nature.

Accepting Aristotle's natural-scientific knowledge and results as sufficient, the Middle Ages dealt with nature primarily in the context of the human being, his sinfulness, and the question of how to overcome this limitation and attain deification. They also engaged in attempts to conceptually articulate the divinely revealed mysteries concerning God and His triune nature. Thus, the study of nature in the sense of the natural sciences was largely set aside, especially in the East. In the West, the situation was somewhat different, yet the true shift of interest toward nature as creation, and above all toward the human being, though also toward other earthly beings, occurred in Humanism, no longer from a theocentric (heavenly) but from an earthly, human-centric perspective, a shift that continued and was radicalized in what is called the Modernity.

2.3. Modern Shift

With the human-centric turn in the Modernity, nature fell under *legislation*, such that not only human society but nature itself became understood as governed by laws.

¹⁶ The concept of personhood was brought forth through the joint work of the holy Fathers of the Church from Cappadocia in the fourth century, namely, the brothers Basil and Gregory the Great, as well as Gregory the Theologian (Popović 2004: 167).

The legislation of nature, however, is not imposed upon it from without; it is inherent and immanent to it, such that the *naturalness* of what is natural is taken to consist precisely in its intrinsic *lawfulness*.¹⁷ The laws of nature in modern physics, unlike human laws, are subject to mathematization, that is, to their translation into mathematical formulas, arithmetical calculation, and geometrical representation and measurement. Nature is understood as matter (*res extensa*) in motion¹⁸ through space and time. Matter is internally divided into bodies (*corpuscles*), and with further theoretical developments these give way to atoms. Bodies possess in themselves certain properties, mass, magnitude, and shape, the so-called *primary qualities*, while through contact with our senses they give rise in our consciousness to representations of bodies as their *secondary qualities*.

¹⁷ That these laws were of divine origin, just as creation itself was, constituted a central tenet of so-called rationalism; thus, for Newton as well, gravity was understood as a divine force and influence. A materialist turn occurs with the French Encyclopedists, and an atheistic reading of Newtonian mechanics becomes dominant and unquestioned until the new developments in the philosophy of science in the twentieth century.

¹⁸ Heidegger accurately sketches the modern-age pathos of natural science: “Today, with the dominance of mechanistic thought in modern natural science, we are inclined to regard the fundamental form of motion as locomotion in the sense of movement from one place in space to another, and to “explain” everything that is in motion in accordance with that form. That type of motion—κίνησις κατὰ τόπον, motion with respect to place or position—is, for Aristotle, only one kind of motion among others, and in no way stands out as movement *simpliciter*.” (Heidegger 2003: 222)

In modern political and social philosophy, the concept of nature, particularly in the form of the notions of *the state of nature* and *human nature*, played a crucial role within *social contract theories*.¹⁹ Theories of the social contract aim to justify the existence of civil society and the state by means of the idea of the natural—as the pre-social condition of humanity—which is construed in such a way that, owing to its deficiencies, it must be overcome by transitioning into the social or political condition through the so-called social contract. These are philosophical constructions that do not aspire to offer a historically or factually accurate description of some ancient period of humankind, but are instead conceptually devised for the purpose of legitimizing the order of civil society and the state as the forms in which a dignified human life becomes possible. The typical representatives of this modern ‘tradition’ of thought are Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, and Kant.²⁰ Regarding the function the concept of nature served in constructions such as the state of nature, which alludes to the original nature of the human being, Joachim Ritter rightly emphasizes: “The concept of nature in political economy, in the same sense as in all natural theories of law or the state in the 17th and 18th centuries, has the methodological intention of safeguarding it from the adoption of concepts and principles that belong to historically prior orders and their theological theories, so that modern society could then count as an immediate

¹⁹ The first appearance of the idea that the origin of human society and the state can be explained by deriving them from a certain natural state of man—out of which he emerges through a contractual agreement—is found among the Sophists

²⁰ See in ((Hobbes, 1998); (Locke, 1988); (Rousseau, 2002); (Kant, 2000)).

phenomenon—one that, in contrast to all historical phenomena, reflects the constant, historically independent nature of man.” (Ritter 1989: 49)

Nevertheless, the idea common to all of them is that the formation of civil society and state authority must be justified without any appeal to God. Instead, legitimacy must be grounded secularly, i.a. rationally, by invoking the contractually affirmed will of individuals who voluntarily transfer a portion of their sovereignty over themselves, that is, a portion of their freedom, to society or to the state authority in exchange for security, peace, and stability, the three conditions of a dignified communal life. Thus, the classical social-contract theories interpret this transition solely on the level of justification, while the transition itself remains the least developed element within them.

A decisive shift in the understanding of nature, one that marked the subsequent development of conceptualizations of this phenomenon, occurred with Kant. Although he does not explicitly spell out the consequences, the results of all three *Critiques* entail a certain possibility, if not a direct transition, then at least the opening toward an inversion, of the places occupied by the natural and the artificial within the logical-ontological hierarchy. This, in turn, paves the way for a reductionism that privileges the artificial under the various names of work of World Spirit, social production, ideology, construction. Namely, in the place in which concept of nature played a role of essence, Kant’s Copernican Revolution leaves behind only an ‘empty space’ of the unknowable, now designated as the *thing-in-itself*, while nature is relocated into the realm of

appearance and revealed as a „construct“ of pure reason²¹. Nature previously conceived mechanistically as a system of material bodies in motion, is in Kant re-interpreted as something constructed, that is, artificial, in the sense that the nature we encounter in experience would not exist without the knowing subject who, being affected, organizes the chaotic manifold of sensible data through the cognitive *a priori* apparatus of the subject.

However, the domain of the artificial, that is, of the constructed, although not under that name, extends in Kant to the totality of human experience. In this way, the classical distinction between the natural and the artificial is erased in his philosophy and transformed into the thesis that Schopenhauer succinctly encapsulates in the claim that ‘*world is my representation.*’ For what is a representation, if not a construct of consciousness arising as the result of affection of senses or soul by something which, in itself, is never knowable (at least for Kant and contemporary constructivists and so called “post-modern” thinkers)?

More will be said about Kant and the relation of his thought to the notion of artificial intelligence in the second part of the text. Independently of Kant, however, this constructivist tendency in the understanding of human nature has persisted to the present day in various

²¹ Of course, Kant does not employ the notion of a *construct* or *construction* in the context of his transcendental analysis of the constitution of the phenomenal world and of experience. Nevertheless, since the phenomenal world and the objects we encounter within experience would not exist without the ‘work’ performed by the subject’s cognitive faculties upon the sensible data, the application of this term may be regarded as justified.

philosophical and ideological formulations. Nevertheless, what concerns us here above all is how the concept of human nature develops after Kant.

After Hegel, whose thesis of the self-production of the human being gave momentum to the Marxist reinterpretation of that very thesis, it was, nevertheless, the materialist–constructivist trajectory of thought that prevailed. This trajectory unfolds from Darwin's conception of the human as an evolutioned animal sharing common ancestors with apes, through Freud's attempt to ground, in a thoroughly positivistic manner, a science of the soul and of personality as a mechanism of drive-sublimation, and Nietzsche's affirmation of the body and the overcoming of the human being, all the way to neo-Marxist interpretations and syntheses of these three tendencies with Heideggerian efforts to abandon metaphysics and logocentrism. Thus, in all these variants of thought, human nature was regarded as a construct, whether biological, social, or discursive, but in any case as something artificial, contingent, and materially grounded. If we add to this the element common to all major ideologies of liberalism to socialism, communism, nazism and fascism, namely the idea of *creating a new man*, then the conclusion becomes clear: if the 'previous' human was in fact constructed, and if all these ideologies hold that the world which produced him (ancient regime) ought to be rejected and erased through revolution, the only remaining question is how to construct this new and improved human being.

Contemporary currents of *post-* and *trans-humanism* continue along this same line of thought, as the culminating processes of the shift toward a human-centered perspective that began as the birthplace of

Modernity. The traditional natural- artificial distinction has therefore faded and now merely vegetates in the fog of everyday discourse, slowly dying out. With the predominance of the artificial, both at the discursive and the empirical level, the task of a more serious reflection on this very distinction arises.

3. The Concept of the Artificial: From the Non-Natural, Through the Counter-Natural, to Natural as Artificial

Heidegger rightly observes that "... 'nature' in various epochs of Western history ... always contains an interpretation of the being-as-a-whole, even when it seemingly represents only one side of some dichotomy. In all these dichotomies, nature is not merely the opposite side but essentially has primacy, in that the other member of the dichotomy is always and above all differentiated in relation to it, and is thereby defined by it" (Heidegger 2003: 215).

In dealing with the history of the concept of the natural, we could not avoid already touching upon the artificial and its forms. We have seen that the artificial, in the sense of being opposed to the natural as a human creation, first appears with the Sophists as νόμος, primarily in the sense of convention, custom, state law, or some rule. Later, with the conceptualization of nature as essence, the artificial appears as the phenomenal, that is, the being in a weaker sense, for Plato in relation to the Ideas, which are understood as the true nature of things, and later the phenomenal extends, according to the Skeptics, to the totality of beings accessible to us in general. In Aristotle, the artificial is reconceptualized and relaxed, as it appears as a mode of the natural, that is, as human-natural, thus grounded in human nature.

Human νόμος, πόησις, τέχνη, etc., are no longer in opposition as the Sophists had seen them.

In modern philosophy, the artificial appears as *subjective*, that is, entirely dependent on the nature and existence of humans, and then as constructed through the senses, imagination, or reason. It begins from the derived or social state, such as the state as the political articulation of the social contract. The opposition between nature and humans, (object-subject) founded on the opposition of nature conceived as matter in motion under the natural laws and the free human self-consciousness spirit on the other hand, reaches its peak in Hegel, which is best seen in his lectures on *Aesthetics* (Hegel 1975), where the products of fine art, according to the criterion of beauty, are placed as incomparably higher than natural beauty, because they are the product of the free human spirit, which in art reveals itself as free and spiritual, unlike nature seen as spirit in its self-forgetfulness or *Otherness* (*Anderessein*).

However, the materialist turn, rooted in Kantian constructivism and hegelian rooted Marxism oriented toward socio-economic praxis, and reinforced by tendencies in psychoanalysis and the positivist development of the sciences, places the artificial at the foundation of humanity, while science and philosophy, sometimes implicitly, sometimes explicitly, are pushed toward the situation we face today: namely, that constructivism has become the self-evident horizon and metanarrative of philosophy and the social sciences. Thus, the artificial, from the phenomenal to the subjective, has transformed into a construct and/or ideology. In neo-marxist interpretations such as Foucault and Levinas, discursivity as such, and with it the human lifeworld constituted on it, is equated with ideology, which is understood as a legitimizing-

constructivist mechanism for shaping and managing reality, or for the distribution of power. Derrida, in his own way, repeats this with the thesis on the 'inevitability of the text' and the deconstruction of all structures, understood as constructions, as the only remaining path to what was once called philosophy or metaphysics.

However, the artificial has explicitly returned to everyday discourse through the naming of a new phenomenon, artificial intelligence. Yet, aside from artificial intelligence, the term, along with the conceptualization of difference, and even difference itself, is increasingly disappearing from everyday discourse. The deficiency of everyday discourse on the artificial lies in the purely negative understanding of the it, which is reduced to the non-natural or contra-natural, whereas the concept of the natural in the same discourse suffers the fate of other fundamental notions, such as time and being: it is used with ease and taken for granted, and when the question of explication arises, silence ensues.

In everyday discourse, nature has become a romanticized illusion of a 'long-lost homeland' for the modern uprooted human, alienated from the national cultures and traditions from which they have been self-exiled, falling into the monotonous and gloomy routine of the technological world and urban 'jungles.' Nature was then conceived as an object of scientific knowledge and a referential object of security in terms of environmental endangerment, and finally as that which is organic, in the sense of opposition to genetically modified food. In any case, such understandings of nature have moved away from its essence, just as humans

have become estranged from living nature and the rhythm of its being.

The artificial, on the other hand, in the sense of *inauthenticity*, as a kind of distorted behavior that does not correspond to the being that naturally acts in such a way, presupposes the concept of the natural as original, chosen, authentic, and thus in identity with itself. Thus, phenomena such as pretending, lying, flattering, fawning, unwarranted boasting, the so-called ‘beating one’s chest,’ etc., are examples of inauthentic, that is, contrived behavior, and stand in opposition to the natural, which here would be understood as truthful, that is, in accordance and alignment of the speaker’s or actor’s words and deeds with their personality and intentions.

Finally, the concept of the artificial, in the context of artificial versus human or natural intelligence, is primarily based on the ancient distinction between φύσις and τέχνη. However, what is new in this distinction is that under artificial intelligence there is assumed some kind of autonomy in the operation of the artificial, which imitates, or exists in a mode of *as if it is* truly autonomous, or intelligent. This seems to concern appearance, external perception, or our understanding of artificial intelligence. This is reflected in everyday discourse, where it has become customary to address AI programs such as chatGPT as if they were rational and communicative subjects, leading to expressions such as ‘Ask chatGPT,’ ‘chatGPT tricked me,’ or ‘chatGPT helped me,’ and so on. An additional prompt for reflection is provided by so-called *generative AI*, which calls into question the ‘as if’ character of artificial intelligence, that is, it challenges the thesis that AI cannot be called an autonomous subject.

We will return to this question later, but for now it is important to make a first overview of the situation with regard to the primary question of our work, which is the history of the origin and development of the natural-artificial distinction, in order to be able to address the questions that have arisen and opened up along the way.

In short, the discourse on the binary opposition of the natural and the unnatural presupposes realism, substantialism, and epistemological optimism. However, starting with the ancient Sophists and Sceptics and continuing up to contemporary post-philosophical authors, this distinction, along with the mentioned presuppositions, has been questioned as false, impossible, and illusory. In the reversal, attempts were made to hypostatize the artificial and reduce the natural to it, in order to reject the distinction (Kant, Marx, Foucault, Derrida). The consequences of such an approach are reflected in conclusions that are usually entirely counter-intuitive to ordinary or average, even normal, consciousness and intuition. But that is not all; the consequences are also absolutely anti-human and destructive to traditional Christian values and beliefs, as well as to philosophical or metaphysical, substantialist positions.

Performatively, the consequences are of a legitimizing nature for ideological conceptions of man as a construct, or of the entire reality as a construct, which as such is not and cannot be the object of so-called 'objective knowledge,' but rather a question of mastery over the process of constructing, understood as mastery over reality for the sake of revolutionary destruction of the old and construction of a new order 'from scratch,' that is, a question of possession and distribution of power.

In the development of variations on the theme of conceptualizing the non-natural human, a path emerged from the rational-subjective, through ideology, to the notion of the construct. What is common to all of them is the reversal of positions, so that through the total hypostatization of either the self-conscious rational subject in the form of the world spirit, or the equation of discursivity itself with ideology as a discursive dispositif for constructing reality for the sake of power distribution, or the identification of being with a construct, where the term ideology is replaced with construct, in each case, nature is presented as in some way derived from the non-natural human, while the human itself, as non-natural, is presented as the original construct and the first constructor.

But if these theorists are right and if they speak the truth, then we must also accept the consequences, even if the entire world collapses. That is why we are interested in what reasons and motives could have stood behind such a critique. What is it concerned with, if it can be legitimized and thus compel acceptance?

4. The Humanological Way of Distinguishing the Natural and the Artificial: Reasons for Preserving the Distinction

Romčević, in his analysis of artificial intelligence (Romčević 2025), starts from Kants first *Critique*, but precisely because he deliberately skips starting the analysis from the distinction between *physis* and *nomos*, he misses one questionable division in Kant. Specifically, Kants the determination of reflective judgment as technical/artistic (*künstlich*), that is, artificial/non-natural cognitive power, is not *prima facie* persuasive. Namely,

as we already shown, the physis-nomos distinction essentially represents the Sophist division into the natural (non-human) and the human (non-natural), this distinction is loosened in the Socratic tradition, in which the idea of human nature appears, for which what is natural is precisely the artistic/technical, but also political-moral judgment. Recall, for Aristotle, man is by nature a political animal, who by nature strives for knowledge, strives for happiness in the political community and in individual life; his customary habits become his second nature, and artistic creativity²² naturally belongs to him, in short, the whole realm of nomos turns out to be part of nature, and that part the most exalted.

This raises the question of what leads Kant to *denaturalize* the reflective power of judgment and, more generally, the domain of human culture and spirituality?

First, we can say that what leads Kant to such a conclusion is precisely his concept of nature, which differs radically from Aristotle's. For Kant, the situation is turned on its head. Refraining from epistemic pretension about the thing-in-itself, or nature in the Aristotelian sense, Kant now understands nature as a *lawfully ordered system of phenomena that can be encountered through sensual perception within the horizon of space and time*, in the so-called "external world" or „external experience“. Nature, as the system of phenomenal world, is organized by *a priori* cognitive faculties, that is, by the principles of the reason and

²² According to Aristotle, the development of tragedy occurred successively and gradually, that is, *naturally*, just like the development of the *polis* from the family or household, through village.

categories of understanding; it is a sort of *a posteriori* construct of the *a priori* pure reason imposed upon the chaotic sensory manifold. Humans, in their phenomenal domain, are likewise natural beings, but this nature does not determine them in any essential sense.

But if, setting aside the artificial, according to Kant, the technical and artistic, even the genius, that is, the creative and inventive, belongs to it, then the “natural” falls into the *schematic* or *mechanical*. Isn’t this an at least unusual result? If what is traditionally considered human, natural human qualities such as freedom, spontaneity and creativity, initially gives the artificial the character of negative freedom in the sense of liberation from the “constraint” of following rules of understanding, and then, again, freedom in the positive sense of the possibility of creating new rules of supposition, it turns out that what was traditionally thought of as human and naturally human is now classified as artificial and unnatural, that is, from the traditional perspective, *non-human*. This sequence of reversal was subsequently philosophically developed by authors such as Lyotard, Adorno, Barthes, Foucault, and Derrida, and Romčević aligns himself with them in this.

However, if in Kant what was traditionally understood as human has become artificial, and the artificial, once understood as unnatural, has now become that which enables and constructs nature, but as an artificial product of the artificial, then from the traditional concept of nature as essential and self-subsisting, that is, from the entire distinction between natural and artificial, nothing remains. The natural turns out to be an artificially constructed product of a temporally and logically prior construct. The natural is an artificial product of an artificially produced producer.

But where there is no longer anything natural and essential, there is no humanity either. These consequences were clearly drawn by the aforementioned authors theses: Foucault (the death of man and the author), Adorno (the aesthetic as non-human and liberating), etc. A consistent consequence of this position is *total constructivism* on the ontological level, with the strategy of *deconstructivism* as a claim to dismantle all constructs on the epistemic level, and *post-* and *trans-humanism* agenda on the discursive and practical level. Artificial intelligence thus becomes a *pleonasm*, and indeed it seems that a more precise term would be non-human, which Romčević rightly concludes.

Without questioning the consistency of this line of thought, given Kantian assumptions, this reasoning allows us to call into question its *phenomenological legitimacy*, that is, its alignment with our pre-theoretical understanding and manifestation of the phenomenon itself, and thus with its very essence.

4.1 Man as a Being of Transcendence Within the State of Nature

First, it should be noted that the starting of philosophical inquiry, when discussing already fixed discursive positions that interpret the same phenomenon in opposite ways, should be set at the point from which both positions emerge, a point that, although itself discursive, has a different referential relation to the same phenomenon. More precisely, by returning to that point, one should enable a new approach to the phenomenon, one that would be original, and if necessary *primitive*, but all the closer to the phenomenon itself in its manifestation.

Where does the phenomenological basis of this distinction lie, from which the entire discussion has emerged? It becomes evident that in the case of this distinction, one of the two differentiated things is precisely the entity that establishes the difference through the act of differentiation. This differentiating entity is ourselves. But is the very power of differentiation, evidently belonging to this entity, sufficient on its own to accept the thesis of a distinction between the natural and the artificial, in the sense that it is precisely this power that is natural, that is, inherently belonging to humans, and at the same time necessary, yet not the only distinction between humans, or human nature, and other natural beings? For conceptual distinctions, that is, the ability to distinguish *something as something* from *something as something else*, seems to be possessed only by humans.

In drawing the distinction between the natural and the artificial, an ontological feature of an entire class of objects we designate as artificial emerges as foundational: namely, *their existence and structure are dependent upon human beings*. Such entities belong exclusively to the human world and are quickly recognized as incapable of “caring for themselves.” Analogous to Plato’s pointed critique of writing and the primacy of the spoken word, where “the written word cannot defend or represent itself”, the same holds for all human-made things as opposed to naturally existing beings. The domain of these objects is the domain of the typically human world and of human responsibility, that is, the domain of the non- natural, though not yet anti-natural. Yet we observe that human nature does not render these things natural in themselves, but precisely human. Why, then, deny the naturalness of humanity by appealing to its creative and free character? To claim that humans have no nature because they create (or construct)

everything that pertains to them is simply circular reasoning. For it is precisely that which humans cannot create themselves, what they encounter as eternal nature, termed such because it is not under their responsibility but encountered as a given, that constitutes the very power of creation, the exercise of freedom, and ultimately, the capacity for differentiation itself.²³

It follows from this that the human is as much natural as it is, if not more importantly, *acquired*. Therefore, one must distinguish the *innate* from the *acquired*: the natural as given-in-itself and thus found already present in the

²³ This circularity, in the form of a claim to self-foundation and self-legitimation, is highlighted by Habermas as an epochal and distinctive feature of modern philosophical discourse. (See (Habermas 1984).) The endeavor to explain and justify all that exists through reason, through something human, and thus to explain man by man himself, unfolds in a circular process. This circle was not lost on the philosophical giants of German classical idealism, although they responded to it differently. For Kant, it provided the reason to limit the claims of knowledge from things-in-themselves to the *a priori* structures of the subject and the phenomenal realm, which remains the domain of the natural sciences. For Hegel, on the other hand, it served as both the starting point and the ultimate outcome of thought, constituting the internal legitimation of the system as a necessary and absolute form of philosophy. A radically different treatment of this circularity, and consequently a distinct epochal evaluation of Modernity, is offered by Bodin in his polemically structured book according to Habermas, *Philosophical Discourse of Liberalism* (2019). In it, Bodin reveals this legitimacy conceptual matrix as the structural core of liberalism. Within this framework, Modernity as an epoch emerges as the result of the operation of liberalism conceived as *comprehensive phenomenon*, rather than the reverse. Bodin also proposes an alternative as a way to escape this circularity, avoiding a return to any previous form of thought, yet with the clear intention and claim of preserving or rescuing philosophy from self-abolition, reviving and enriching it through the reestablishment of its relationship with science and the *Lifeworld*.

human, versus that which arises according to human nature. In this way, the concept of human nature is further subdivided into potential or dispositional, what exists in itself, and the actual, in the sense of developed forms of human creations (language, customs, nation, culture, etc.). But where, then, does the artificial come into play, and when does it arise? Can it not be said that the artificial, the inauthentic, or the false is also, by the very nature of the human, inherent, since it follows from the characteristics of creativity, freedom, and the capacity to differentiate, as modes through which these are realized?

For this distinction, it is evidently necessary to invoke some literally *meta-physical* criterion, that is, non-natural, though not in the sense of being against nature, but rather *supra-natural*. We must, therefore, phenomenologically examine what constitutes the difference.

We have noted that, man, as a being of differentiation, possesses, by virtue of his freedom and creativity, *the capacity to transcend nature as given, as well as to perfect or regress his own condition*. We designate *this as human transcendence. The transcendence of human nature is guided by the interest of human safety, understood as the interest in transcending the state of nature, seen as state of threat or actual misery,*²⁴ toward

²⁴ In the Serbian language, the term *bez-bednost*, which we translate as “human safety,” signifies a state free from misery (*beda*). Literally “*bezbednost*” means “state without misery” Ontologically understood, human safety presupposes the concept of *ontological misery* as an *existential void or deficiency*, not only of physical and material security, but also of the meaning of life and value. So human

a derived state of humanity, that is, an identity constituted within a community in which the dynamism of both structure and individuals is directed toward the realization of well-being.

Human transcendence in itself does not guarantee normatively positive outcomes, since freedom allows the interest of human safety to become distorted during its realization, potentially inverting into an *interest of control*. In this way, one moves from the mode of the state of nature to that of the unnatural or *demonic*, under the presupposition that natural beings, so-called *beasts*, are incapable of distinctly human radical evil. *It is within the domain between the demonic and the unnatural that the occurrence of the artificial takes place.*²⁵

Transcendence is then other name for the interest of human safety as fundamental ontological structure and existential interest of human being. Interest of human safety is manifested in the capacity to actualize existence between the supra-natural and the contra-natural, a capacity that also eludes natural beings, while its

safety is distinguished from security in a similar fashion as Heideggerian ontological-ontic distinction. For a more detailed discussion, see M. Bodin, *Philosophy of Human Safety and Security* (2024).

²⁵ It is no coincidence that, in the Christian vision, the devil is depicted as a liar and a cunning figure and that Hegel, who in his system seeks to establish the identity of the Holy and the worldly Spirit, refers to the Reason of such a spirit as “cunning.” If this synthesis can be recognized from the standpoint of classical logic as anti-Christian, it is logically irrelevant to Hegel’s “logic,” since the proximity of antithesis and thesis is expressed within the systematic higher synthesis, where contradiction is reconciled. Nevertheless, Christianity has no obligation to legitimize itself before Hegelian dialectics and may, in peace of soul, declare it a dangerous heresy, whereas Hegel carries an obligation of defense before Christianity, given that he claims a Christian character for his philosophy.

distortion and degenerative tendencies man shares with natural beings.

The artificial can be that which *is within*, but *is not of* nature. In a normatively neutral mode, the artificial simply is this; in a normatively negative mode, the artificial stands in opposition to the natural, in a mode of *contrariety*. Beyond mere opposition, it can also manifest as distortion, representing a disruption in natural development, either one that has not been fully realized or has deviated from the natural course.

The difference between the natural and the human-natural resides in transcendence, i.e. interest of human safety which carries the potential for distortion or inversion into the counter- natural.

In light of the above, what are the consequences of the insights gained regarding the nature of the distinction between natural/human and artificial intelligence? In what does the specificity of natural-human intelligence consist, and in what does that of artificial intelligence consist? We must also examine to what extent it is justified to call artificial intelligence “artificial,” and to what extent it can be properly regarded as “intelligent” at all.

5. Conclusion

If we say that fallibility, and the authenticity inherent in that fallibility, constitutes a distinctive negative criteria of *human-natural* as opposed to artificial *intelligence*, one could immediately object that artificial intelligence, too, is certainly prone to making mistakes.

Nevertheless, there is a significant difference in the nature of those mistakes.

Let us consider an example that I have personally experienced several times while working as a high-school philosophy teacher. The students were assigned to write a seminar paper on a given philosophical topic. After they submitted their work, I examined the papers in order to grade them. Very quickly, I could discern which students had used an artificial-intelligence tool to write their papers and which had not. Namely, the responses given by those students whom I immediately suspected, and subsequently confirmed empirically, to have copied answers from *ChatGPT* or some other AI tool were what we colloquially call *generic*. Not only were such answers clearly beyond the students' actual knowledge of the history of philosophy (which I already knew to be practically nonexistent), but their manner of expression also revealed that they had translated the answers from English on their own, without any familiarity with established philosophical terminology or with the author's specific terms, whether in the original language, in English, or in the standard scholarly translations available in our philosophical community. Their seminar papers exhibited a sort of impersonal uniformity, and the only element in them that was in any sense authentic, indicating that they were written by young people with little understanding of the topic, were, unsurprisingly, the *mistakes*. Yet these mistakes differed both from the kinds of errors AI tools typically make and from those produced by students who had made a genuine effort to research, write, and think independently, whose papers consequently differed drastically from one another, each reflecting the student's individual personality. The mistakes made by students who copied AI outputs

consisted primarily in mistranslations or in completely missing the topic due to poorly formulated prompts they had given to the tool. In other words, it was obvious that the answer generated by the AI was relatively adequate, but that it had been produced in response to a poorly conceived question. AI responses tended to be rather too abstract, general, factually correct, yet devoid of any trace of deep reflection or interpretation. They consisted of standard phrases and constructions drawn from its textual memory of introductory treatments of philosophers, typically the most generic, schoolbook summaries. Any “novelty” in an AI-generated answer amounted merely to a “new” recombination of existing information. By contrast, the students who wrote their seminar papers on their own did not fulfill the assignment in the required sense. They clearly demonstrated that they did not understand what philosophical argumentation is, as it was entirely absent. They repeatedly presented their own views, convictions, and feelings, often without supporting them with anything other than an occasional example favourable to their position. And yet, the trace of humanity in those papers consisted precisely in their blissful unawareness of having missed the point, in their youthful self-confidence in articulating their views, and in the sentence constructions that revealed an author who is a human being with his or her own inner rhythm. In short, although the papers differed greatly from one another in quality, and although all of them fell far below the standards of philosophical thinking, they remained original within the limits of their authors’ abilities. The consequences that follow from this everyday example, with respect to distinguishing human from artificial intelligence, are the following.

Thus, human fallibility is *alethic*:²⁶ it disclose the one who wees in his individuality and authenticity, *for each person errs in a way that is uniquely his own*. The fallibility of AI, by contrast, is mechanical and is, in essence, derived from the limitations of human capacities for calculation and prediction, or installed algorithms. Hence, contrary to Kant, *schematic-mechanical thinking is what is truly artificial*, that is, non-natural in the sense of human nature. Inventive, creative thinking, even when naïve or mistaken, constitutes the medium through which human nature is manifested, as well as the individual character of the thinker. Human fallibility, of course, rests upon our finitude. Yet this finitude, more precisely, the limits of that finitude, are not known to us, whatever Kant may have thought. Human limitation is grounded in the *indeterminacy* of the elements whose co-relation and dynamism condition our thinking.

The limitation of AI is determinately finite, for it operates with a precisely specifiable set of elements that function in transparently ascertainable ways, albeit over an enormous volume of data and within a very short span of time. Thus, although its errors are not predictable *in concreto*, they are *a fortiori* attributable to the programmer who defined the algorithm.

In short, human intelligence is richer in its constitutive elements and possesses a moment of productive indeterminacy called *authenticity*, which arises from the subjectivity that undergoes cognitive operations and processes, a subjectivity that AI precisely lacks. It may

²⁶ This term comes from greek ἀληθεια in sense of truth, but truth conceived as disclosure or revealing.

sound like a pleonasm, yet it is *humanity itself* that is absent in artificial intelligence, but not because humanity is a artificial construct of older origin.

AI challenges us to reflect upon our own nature, a nature we do not fully understand, in order to grasp it more clearly through its difference, and thereby, reflexively, to understand ourselves as well. Paradoxically, the development of AI proceeds as an attempt to imitate human intelligence; yet insofar as we fail to understand the human, we merely *guess* while constructing models of AI. If and when these models manage to produce something resembling our own products, we then retrospectively conclude that we have thereby understood ourselves.

But such attempts are *a priori* doubly futile:

1. We can always doubt in the identity of results, because results of human intelligence can never be ultimately definable, which implies from impossibility of definition of human intelligence;

2. Even if the identity of results could be accepted, that does not testify to the identity of processes which lead to them;

3. The similarity of results arises from the fact that they share a common subject of origin, the very same human being who inquires into himself and constructs the models in the first place.

AI is a tool, highly sophisticated, to be sure, but nonetheless a tool, and it cannot become anything beyond that. More simply, if transcendence and the interest of human safety are the distinctive ontological characteristics of the human being, in contrast to all other beings, then the absence of these characteristics marks the fundamental difference between human and artificial intelligence, a difference grounded in the non-human character of AI. AI cannot fulfill any of the criteria for the realization of the interest of human safety, primarily because it cannot be the bearer of such an interest at all.

As such, AI can only be an object or instrument either for the realization or the violation of the interest, that is, an aid or a threat to the entity whose safety and security are in question: the human being and world.

...

It has turned out that the distinctive, and simultaneously ontological, criterion for differentiating the human being from every other entity, including naturally existing beings, is the interest of human safety as a fundamental existential interest. The human being is thus ontologically characterized in the most fundamental sense as a being that is the bearer of such interest. Such a being, "which we ourselves invariably are," we designate as the *entity of human safety*, or, in abbreviated form, simply the *Entity*.

The interest of human safety, although distinctive, does not exclude the Entity from the order of nature. For the human being is a natural being insofar as the state of nature belongs to it *per se*. This mode of existence, this level of human being, we call *anthropological*. What is humanly natural is not identical with what is non-humanly natural, but it is nevertheless natural in some sense. The interest of human safety expresses the Entity's interest in overcoming the state of nature, but in a manner *natural* to the Entity itself. Thus it emerges that the human being is, in one part of its being, natural, meaning, derived from nature, while in another part of its being, or of its nature, it is not derived from nature, even though it is always already situated within nature. This non-natural, or more precisely supra-natural, moment we designate as transcendence. *The interest of human safety thus proves to be the Entity's interest in transcending the anthropological state, not by abolishing, but by*

transforming its existence into the humane state. This transformation presupposes the realization of the Entity's state of safety. The totality of human affairs, culture, art, politics, science, religion, constitutes a conglomerate of diverse possibilities for articulating and effectuating the interest of human safety in the act of transcending, understood as the realization of transcendence.

In this sense, the artificial operates within the plane of the humane state, yet as a potentially disruptive and security- threatening factor, and as such it is decidedly non-natural, more precisely, counter-natural, opposed both to the human and the non-human. However, the “natural” to which the artificial stands as an opposite is not nature in the sense of the natural (*anthropological*) state, but nature in the sense of the *derived*, humane state. Thus the artificial carries within itself the potential to lapse into the demonic, on the one hand, and to invert the interest of human safety in the course of its realization, on the other, thereby effectuating a condition of misery.

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