

Marija Todoroska¹

PhD

Independent researcher

A CONCEPT OF “FUTURITY” IN DERRIDA, MALABOU AND NANCY

Abstract: *In this paper we want to examine the position of the three famous French philosophers in relation to futurity, we see something in the present as the future. It immediately points to the problem of the future, especially today when we can freely say that we live in futurity, a future of unpredictable outcome, if that is the case at all. The transitivity of futurity as it is understood by Derrida, Malabou and Nancy refers to the possibilities of its appearance, with the danger of non-appearance, to the metrical change, of whose presence we are not aware, to the displacement of all our established designations. The promise, the surprise, the responsibility are just some philosophical connotations of futurity that the three French philosophers give as an answer to an unknown and terrifying future.*

Key words: *futurity, responsibility, messianism, deconstruction, post-structuralism.*

Derrida – spectral deconstruction of the future

Derrida's approach to thinking about the future is deconstructive, like any philosophical concept. It means in every possible way a departure from the usual

¹ omnimaria20@yahoo.com

philosophical tradition of establishing the philosophical concept as self-reflective and self-sufficient. Derrida starts from the double terminological determination of the future in the French language which distinguishes *à venir* and *futur*. What Derrida is interested in *à venir* – a future that is immediate, close, what is to come, absolute uncertainty, as opposed to *futur*, which for Derrida is indicated, represented, whose being is unrelated to the present (Derrida 1996: 68). There is no catalyst between these two ontic dimensions of time in Derrida. The essential disconnection results from the inadequacy of the ontic appearance of *à venir* which, in relation to the *futur*, belongs to the possible *modus*. A *venir* is something that we can do, and *futur* is the designator of content, accumulation, certainty, sum. And Derrida's general interest was always on the side of the unstable aspect of existence, against the stable constellation of existence, which for him is metaphysical. When Derrida says about *à venir* that it is not something strictly unrepresented, it is not an act, it is a displacement of understanding, it is not something irrational – in Husserlian terms, something that arises through plural logic and rationalizations (Derrida 2003: 20), but it is a provocation of opinion. For Derrida, it is not movement, but something that makes movement possible (Derrida 1979: XVII - XX), unexpected direction, declination that become deviations of spatiotemporality. But Martinon explains this spatiotemporal shift, which is not spatiotemporal, with *différance* of movement. For Martinon, the movement that can also be a game, principle, work, duration, synchronicity, finally collapse – one into another (Martinon 2007: 4), but that deconstructive explanation is already overcome by

Derrida because the *différance* that postulates another or in the other is the prerogative of predictability. The determination of *à venir* is outside of spatiotemporal localization, but is represented in a time and space that are without substance and without destination. A *venir* does not belong to the corpus of measured or measurable quantities in space and time and therefore in Derrida they take the form of promises, vigils, messianism, events events absolutely not rooted in the living present. And for Derrida, there is no spatiotemporal implication, neither as predictability, nor from the aspect of the present (Derrida 1979: 143). Such a present is under attack by Derrida because it halves a self-affectiveness that must be kept in a *pure* form, which is only possible to be effected through repetitions. Such a present which is only retention without projection is incapable of intending the singular, the invention. The living present is a contaminated reality, the dirt that sustains the singular event, an accumulated and projected reality, the limit of understanding. Impossibility of future to be constructed or deconstructed derives from the nature of this self-determined act, beyond any consensus, analogy or prestabilization. Even his own utterance from *Of grammatology* that "the future can only be anticipated through the form of absolute danger and with the possibility of being proclaimed as a kind of monstrosity" is partially correct, because *à venir* is out the register of any proclamation or pamphlet (Derrida 1976: 5).

Futurity as an act belongs entirely to phenomenology, according to Derrida, but not the phenomenology of retention, production, *epochē*, but the one where archeology and eschatology meet, retention without an absolute beginning and eschatology without an absolute end. This and such "phenomenology" incorporates

Husserl's disparate concepts of passive synthesis - genesis and transcendence. They, like pseudo-archaeology and pseudo-eschatology, are unique in having a chance for an event, but also a danger from it capitulation. The arrival of the event as *à venir*, is not a union of archeology and eschatology, but even then it rebukes, provokes, disturbs. Deriving itself semantically from the understanding of arrival in Husserl's phenomenology (as the arrival of everything in correlation with reason and for reason), for Derrida arrival has neither a teleological end nor a horizon of teleological expectation (Derrida 2003; 27). Coming is beyond the horizontal, linear teleological prediction and purpose. The contemplation of the event as futurity is beyond the rationalism of transcendental idealism, where unconditionality is beyond the reach of *eidos* or *idea* and is without a stipulated teleological end. That is why spatio- temporities that are without space and time for Derrida become *a trace*, a trace as an erasure of the trace, a trace that does not reflect adequacy, a trace without direction, of another kind of presence (Derrida 1982; 65). The disparity, the non-existence of parallelism neither metaphysically nor semantically, makes this trace something beyond the empirical reach, beyond any terminological disciplining, beyond the philosophical learned elaboration. Despite Derrida's anti-metaphysical commitment, futurity retains a metaphysical flavor, as long as they are it is thought of as an event at the edge of time. The inability to empirically detect this event neither in the past, nor in the present, nor in the future erases it from the metaphysical conceptual trajectory of anticipation, recognition, prediction. What is understood as *à venir* is a sign, a trace that does not exist in any philosophy, established and understood.

It is a trace that is produced through its own erasure, a trace that is neither visible nor invisible (Derrida 1982:

65). It is the piercing of being by burying, dislocation through disorientation, instantiation through derogation. It traces by canceling self-identification, the self-homogeneity of the present, erasing both genesis, telos, and teleology and ontology (Derrida 1982; 67). Similar to Anaximander's fragment which is first, without a beginning, like a trace without presence, a rupture, an interruption, an exclusion, a cut, so *à venir* arises from nowhere, from the possibility that does not have to appear. The appearance of this differentiated spatiotemporality dislocates all calculations, all forms of familiar opposition – same – other, presence – absence, inside – outside, makes them out of place and irrelevant. It is an escape into the unknown and the different, beyond all philosophical conceptions of representation.

Without the need for synthesis (passive or active), synthesis, synchronization *à venir* peeks out from everywhere, taking on the strangest forms throwing out paradoxical incarnations. The aporeticity of such a future event in and out of time, in and out of space, installs some other, ghostly space and time. Derrida calls this aporeticity *dyad of absolute minimum* (Derrida 1982: 56). Aporia is a place where nothing can be constituted anymore - transcendence, transit without passing. (Derrida 1993: 12). Therefore aporia is not a temporal solution, the insurmountable nature of aporia makes it impractical and plural. There is no aporia that is surmountable through the paths offered. It is overcome through the move of the prosthesis, it is an impracticality that persists (Martinon 2007: 111). The aporia as an expression of the futurity event goes out of the way, the line, faces unmanageability and perverts into a prolonged impractical unexpectedness. It is the finality of *l' à venir* that is intoxicated by its own *à venir* (Martinon 2007:

106). Aporia has the dimensions of a futurity event, presence without presence, impossibility of detection and its overcoming is neither linguistical nor epistemological, because it is not a knowledge of the order of archeology and genealogy. An aporetic event is not a possibility of knowledge, as Heidegger thinks, a pore (poros) to cross, but a limit (peras), which according to Cicero is finitude.

Another expression of unexpected futurity is messianism in Derrida, or more precisely messianism without messianism (Derrida 1994: 180). The way of existence of messianism in Derrida is dubious, with hesitation between two modes – affirmation (coming) and question (coming?). Messianism is the structuring of experience, by consciousness – as the indeterminacy of the dream, until it collides with another Messiah, in any form: God, communism, promised land – with another construction, Messiah, concept. Whenever the question of the appearance of the Messiah is repeated, the promise arises through the panoply of possibility: events, advent (vigil), and Hamacher absolutizes it using Nancy's syntagm: “all transcendental actuality and all empirical coming” (Hamacher 2004: 129). Messiahship is a future event as a special promise, faith, hope - the possibility of its occurrence is contained in its impossibility. The deconstruction of the Messiah as a future event lies in the desire for his appearance, which is at the same time a fear of the appearance, a desire to delay it - that is the paradoxical indecision (undecideability). This outwardness, eccentricity of thought is nothing but an *eshaton* that coincides with the understanding of messianism. These are not aporetic notions, which annul themselves, but notions understood in their deconstructive *à venir* coincidence. This means that the eshaton is not a teleological thought of ascension, judgment or death, but a thought on the edge, a thought

insoluble from creation as its own destruction. Futurity situated between radical impossibility and the future teleologically determined - provokes multi-expressive characterization and non-philosophema. Futurity is breaking the limit and that is in infinity. But *à venir* is not an event in infinity, because then it would not be unhinged, it could not be designated as infinity, but it is unhinging in an infinite displacement of the limits of understanding, of the dislocated event. It is the displacement of the end of time, of the time of the end. Such preformativeness without presence is the destabilizing element of all performatives. This generated performative is not unknowable both as an empirical phenomenon (because it contains it within itself) and as a heterogeneity (because it is beyond knowledge and ignorance). For Derrida, futurity is not the opening of knowledge, nor of the lacuna – the lack, the ignorance. Knowledge does not saturate, does not condense the beginning into a logical-linguistic or semantic description, and it is not even ignorance, but it is the preservation of heterogeneity as a possible future or a reincarnated future (Derrida 1994; 37). The possibility of the representation of *à venir* does not even belong in the register of spirituality, the sign of bilocation of the two worlds. No ghosts, apparitions witness the futurity, because it is an event that does not allow the location of the dislocation, neither temporal nor spatial. In Nancy's language, it is avoiding the sense of dislocation from oneself, and making sense of dislocation. Hence, *à venir* is nonreducible to anything known, acquired, established. Derrida replicates to Stirner, who says about the world of spirits, which inhabits the world of the future, events of the future can be foreseen - means that the coming of evil is a logical construction (Derrida 1994: 170). It is for Derrida the predictable event of the ghost's redemption and re-entry

into the elite order of spirits. If there is a specter then according to Derrida, hospitality and exclusion are consubstantial (Derrida 1994: 176). Thought or idea (as ghosts) is nothing, nothing that takes the form of a body (Derrida 1994: 176). Thus the idea, which ghostly, spectrally spreads, occupies a space, which is not of the merio spectrum. Spectrality is presence without equivalent, only at the level of representation. It is seeing without seeing, a willingness to see a body without a body, a ghostliness that takes the form of a body (Derrida 1994: 187).

And technology, which for Derrida is factual deconstruction, is also one of the monstrosities of the future. Derrida against Husserl considers that technology is not a product of ideal effort, but that it has an empiric genesis, which effectivity is only polishing of geometrical or technological terms. Therefore, the origin of technology is artifactual, which means that it has some kind of quasi-materiality (Lindberg 2021: 6). For Derrida technology, or as he calls it *teletechnologies*, is the embodiment of abstract structures of writing. Teletechnology is writing, a record that solidifies the form of anything, including the technology from which Derrida seeks salvation - through active synthesis, through deconstruction. Therefore teletechnologies, whose aspiration is to intensify past moments through the living present (Husserl sic!) as real time. For Derrida, the frightening thing is that teletechnics (in his time television) twists the notions of living reality, of the image, of the discrete, makes the past as present, distorts reality (Stiegler 2002: 59). Necessity is the problem that technique or technology imposes, whether it is politics or memorization. Necessity does not allow criticism, it

empties the space of knowledge, neutralizes spectrality. Technique with its necessary implications erases criticism, politics, memory with sophisticated attacks from the future (depuis l' à venir) (Stiegler 2002: 64).

Malabu – from negation to plasticity

For Catherine Malabou the future is also the focus of interest visible in the title of her work (*The Future of Hegel*), but also in general as a topic that confronts her with her ideological fathers (Hegel, Heidegger and Derrida). This means that the future or futurity is also problematic for her, which in the *voir-venir* formulation transgresses in terms of dialectics, destruction, deconstruction. According to Martinon, it all culminates in *hyper-destruction* (Martinon 2007: 26), although Malabou conceptualizing the finality of Derrida's deconstruction with need or help of other. Deconstruction ends in the other, as other, and thus does not fulfill her condition for futurity - plasticity.

All three initial terms that Malabou examines – dialectic (of Hegel), destruction (of Heidegger) and deconstruction (of Derrida) are expressions of negativity that must be overcome, so as not to fall into the abyss. The abyss as it is terminological designed - final knowledge, the end of history is always an aporia that requires a radical solution. Hegel's dialectic, as a negative economy of movement, as a transformative term, “denies twice – once it denies itself, and then the whole being” (Malabou 2010: 17). But this kind of transformation, besides being temporally synthetic, it is also ontologically incompatible with futurity because it is an identity transformation, a movement of intra-subjectivity, a perturbative being. And the negation that is derived in this dialectical relationship as temporal is the result of the different times of thought. Malabou here

follows Hyppolite and Heidegger in Hegel's double distinction of time – as chronological and logical. The first time is a historical, chronological exposition, a teleological movement of potentiality and action, while the second is a synthetic union of representation (Malabou 2005: 16). The two times constitute separation and negation, which are not repeated, not closed, but are the basis for understanding separation as the history of time, says Malabou. Such an understanding is an attempt to overcome the aporetic nature of dialectical negation in Hegel, and thus to overcome the closedness of his system – the main obstacle against a possible future or the possibility of a future. The objection to closedness is in fact an understanding of negation as self-encroachment and differentiation, making time no longer linear and directed. Hence Malabou draws the conclusion that time in Hegel is a plastic concept. But how can it all be connected to flexibility, mobility, plasticity. In front of it, plasticity occupies a differentiated place between the logical and the chronological, between the teleological and the representative, the retrospective and the prospective. Thus plasticity is derived as a self-determining occupation of both times, a mobile synthesis of retention and projection (Malabou 2005: 17). Plasticity is the coincidence of time and the thought of time – detectable not as a line, but as a trace. Temporality is what, according to Malabou, saves Hegel from the closure of his system, and with it the consequence that leads to an abyss or transtemporality. This non-simultaneity and non- contemporaneity is a dialectical synthesis of untimeliness. Both positions cancel the future as futurity. The separability of times is a synthesis which, according to Malabou, opens futurity as an unprogrammed future. If the being is not able to double, differentiate, it would be a nihilistic, destructive expression of the future. It is the second mode in which

plasticity appears - negation as destruction in Heidegger. Heidegger's destruction is not methodological, nor logical and ontological like Hegel's. Destruction in Heidegger is not, according to Malabou, destructive in the sense of finality, because it is somehow touchable and indirectly (Malabou 2010: 18). It is an internal decision, an unstructured movement of philosophical content and therefore becomes a transformative rupture, and expressed in the language of Malabou – metamorphosis (Malabou 2010: 19). That is why Heidegger stipulates some type (horizontal-ecstatic exit – Derrida) as a space of pure dislocation with temporal delay. In the spatial fissure and temporal ecstasy, the figure of plasticity appears, but also its absence (Malabou 2010: 9). Heidegger intends to purge philosophy of old concepts, in order to reveal the truth, which requires embodiment. That is why it requires a new plasticity, which will not be obscured by the non-plastic truth of the new age. That new plasticity is non-geometric, non-luminous and means to clearing for a new opening (Malabou 2010: 10). The plasticity of the fissure thus becomes the negation of the usual plastic form, usually metaphysical. In Heidegger, the metaphysical form of plasticity understood in this way becomes destroyed, overcome, deconstructed. That is why Heidegger proposes a way out of the obsolescence (scleroticity) of philosophical concepts, as plastic forms, with the help of the hermeneutic scheme which is the engine for the new critical plasticity (Malabou 2010: 13). The exit that takes the form of a transformative rupture, a break, is read by Malabou as a metamorphosed historicity, not situated in a historical, genealogical beginning (Malabou 2010: 19). Here Malabou makes a terminological displacement of plasticity as metamorphosis and not as transformation (as Roland Barthes thinks), because metamorphosis is not one of the vanes of transformation, but is adaptability,

flexibility that can be used in many ways. Plasticity is transformation, but also resistance to transformation (Dalton 2020: 56). Metamorphosis, like plasticity, is not something that can be deciphered, but a passive-active mutuality of movement. Deconstruction is the third mode of plasticity, which Malabou found in Derrida. Along the lines of Hegel's and Heidegger's previous thoughts, Derrida denotes deconstruction as a destabilizer of all visible communities of tradition, which means exposing or detaching from the established philosophical-historical corpus of problems, ideologies, events, future. If plasticity is deconstruction, then it is a contradictory construction of the future (Martinon 2007: 39), what is created or dislocated, unexpectedly appears before us or from behind us. Plasticity means it has a dichotomous extrapolation – to receive, create form (plastic models) and destructive, destructive (plastic explosives). It is a deconstructive action – a reaction like *différence*. The paradoxical construction of the future as openness to the radical other does not end with plasticity as a secondary effect. But it is a hermeneutic pair of plasticity and *voir-venir* (what comes), an irreducible plurality of events and idioms (Malabou 2010: 20), dialectical self-contradiction and mobility (Malabou 2005: x).

Regardless of the wide terminological range of the concept of plasticity in Malabou - surprise, *voir-venir*, self-determination, synthetic operations (of metamorphosis and materiality), dialectical self-contradiction - it can be lapidarily expressed as movement, self-movement, diffraction and reconstitution of the case or instance. Thus, plasticity is not an event, among others (in the course of history, or a teleological goal – absolute knowledge), but a moment, a moment of self-differentiation, self-movement with a tendency to surpass oneself.

Malabou has a special interest in examining the relationship between biological and symbolic life, with the help of intelligence, with the aim of decoding the plasticity of the brain. Thus the range of interest in her later works is life, intelligence, modification, plasticity, brain, artificial intelligence. The line of thought is obviously directed to the future, but that future in which there is an interference of the artificial, and that is a sufficient condition to examine this relationship in order to perceive plasticity, which makes it possible. The key thing about intelligence, as a determinant of the biological and the symbolic, is that it does not yet have a method that would detect it, and that it is theoretically based. There are measurements of intelligence, but they do not lead to the essence of intelligence, because - contradictorily, they are not its product (Malabou 2019: 2). Tracing back to the historical study of intelligence, Malabou takes the position that Jean Piaget is the closest to the determination of intelligence, which means that it cannot be understood without its developmental component (Malabou 2019: 11), which in turn is a space for the appearance of plasticity. Following Bergson, Piaget, Dewey, Malabou concludes that intelligence as developmental is actually transitory, adaptive, situated between the transcendental and the empirical (Malabou 2019: 11). In an attempt to encompass the irreducible component of intelligence and its freedom, Malabou enumerates three types of metamorphoses of intelligence: genetic, epigenetic metamorphosis, and synaptic simulation and force for automatism (Malabou 2019: 13). The scheme itself shows a gradation in the perception of intelligence, up to the point of a future

metamorphosis - automatism. Through the detailed examination of these metamorphoses, Malabu foresees the emergence of the third metamorphosis, with a call to mitigate the dangers of automated, computerized intelligence, which would be a synthesis of the biological and the symbolic. Malabou on a vain of current technical technological achievements, assumes that in the future computers will be in a state of adaptation, self-transformation and implementation of own codifications. Thus the biosynthesis of computers with synaptic simulations will be capable to make their own design and will be able to change man (as men now intervene biologically, on the genetic material), (Malabou 2019: 13). Automated biocollaboration will show independence in creation, design and execution of decisions, which will mean not to imitating us, mimesis of brain functions, but authentic self-definition. This is Malabou's final implication for brain plasticity, something that will be sharpened in the future. But she is intellectually honest, because through her works, especially *What Should We Do with Our Brains*, (btw book that according to her, it should be rewritten), she was explicit in her attitude, that plasticity is a kind of finality, something that cannot or does not is capable of generating from itself. But in *Morphing Intelligence*, that attitude changes in the potential of plasticity, in line with the latest achievements in the field of artificial intelligence, or with it, it is the last stage called *Artificial Super Intelligence - ASI*. Thus, Malabou's philosophical debate about plasticity goes through confusions, but remains an open concept of the possible future, which would be not so terrible, so devastating.

Nancy – responsibility as a sense of the future

Nancy's entire oeuvre revolves around one concept, or as he says himself (and Malabu does this with her last works, although for her it means a nihilistic attitude towards the previous attitude or work) that his whole life writes only one book - and that's about the concept of the sense. The search for sense goes diachronically and synchronically and is always a concept of the unformulated future, or it is a sense understood beyond all known connotations. Nancy presents all philosophical concepts as finite, concepts with exhausted meaning, or that is nonsense (monstrosity in Derrida, madness in Malabou). All connection of sense with terms like substance, being, existence shows the insufficiency of meaning, precisely because they are exhausted terms of finality, roundness, consequence. Thus, all terms are perverted in their *sense*. If every concept, subjectivity, self, turns to itself, is understood as self-constituted, then closedness, (historical closedness) will mean self-destruction, and the impossibility of existence, not even or the future. And sense is the most important in terms of being, says Nancy. It means thinking about oneself in relation to the other, as openness, and such that does not prejudice correlate! This is the sense of ontological radicality (Nancy 2003; 7), the step of the encounter, the abyss or the risk. The other being is not a duality of expected constructibility, fusion or confusion, an other self because it does not imply an originary or archetypal relation. The nature of the openness of being in itself is not possible to close in a linguistic idiom (Martinon 2007: 71) or in Derridian terms – to gain knowledge about it. There is no projected translation, event, or

momentum of being in itself, being has more of a reference – nothing (Nancy 2003: 7). But with Nancy, nothing is empty, it is the space of the future, with the traps for her and in her. Nancy called it sense and eclipse of sense (Nancy 2003: 111). This advent, vigil over sense, is in fact the responsibility of philosophy about sense. That is why philosophy is absolutely responsible for the sense of the world, which will come, not through the *déjà vu* of history, again resurrection of some already passed sense. Philosophy does not propose (though it has speculation, conjecture incorporated), but is rather exposition – where its propositions are inseparable from the exhibited, (Nancy 2003; 293) philosophy should not allow itself to be annihilated in representation. The engagement of philosophy is in its true character, the opening of sense to come, with the risk of non-arrival. Nancy's responsible principle – is not only responsible for thought and its content, but is absolutely responsible for being - it is responsibility without limits, responsibility for the present and in eternity (Nancy 2003: 294). Responsibility for sense in eternity does not mean a direction, a signification, but is a proliferation that can take any form in the possible modes of exchange. Derrida's and Malabou's understandings of future such as *l'avenir*, *voir-venir*, excess, surprise, are an inexhaustible means or games of language in referencing sense or being responsible for sense. For Nancy it is the promise of sense, only graspable as an anticipation of what is to come from something else, a guarantee of the limit of being. Therefore, the responsibility for the event that will come is not antecedent in the logical construction of the world, there is no certain epoch of truth that should be

realized (Nancy 2003: 295). That anticipatory responsibility for sense is not yet here, it is not present (that is why it is a promise, a speculation, a conjecture), it is not rounded, finished, consequent – it is always according to the other, a going out of itself – for Nancy, an infinite being for another. Infinity for Nancy is not an infinite disposition to the future, but an infinite opening to the sense of the future.

Conclusion

Through the previous elaboration, we wanted to capture the elusiveness, the indeterminacy of futurity as a concept of the sense out of joint. All three French philosophers are dominated by interest in the immediate as dislocation, confusion, monstrosity, but also as promise, spectrality, messianism, plasticity, responsibility. The seeming disparity of these concepts incorporated in futurity only emphasize the heterogeneity of this concept, but not the transformativeness. Futurity is a concept of the metamorphosis, not of the transformation, it is the unpredictable movement, as self-movement, self-constitution, movement through the other as through oneself, movement beyond space and time, beyond measurement.

These connotations are visible today in the digital world as the dislocation of the present, the postponement of the event, the plasticity of computer neural simulation, the expectation of the Messiah (as an event, an appearance under any term), responsibility for the other as oneself, responsibility for the world, being.

References

1. Derrida, J. (1976), *Of Grammatology*, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press
2. Derrida, J. (1979), *Speech and Phenomena*, Evanston: Northwestern University Press
3. Derrida, J. (1982), *Margins of Philosophy*, Chicago: Chicago University Press
4. Derrida, J. (1993), *Aporias*, Stanford: Stanford University Press
5. Derrida, J. (1994), *Spectres of Marx, The State of the Debt, the Work of Mourning & the New Irrationals*, New York: Routledge
6. Derrida, J. (1996), *Archive Fever: A Freudian Impression*, Chicago: Chicago University Press
7. Derrida, J. (2003), The World of Enlightenment to Come (Exception, Calculation, Sovereignty) in: *Research in Phenomenology* 33
8. Dalton, B. (2020), Forms of Freedom: Marie Darrieussecq, Catherine Malabou and the Plasticity of Science in: *Revue d'Etudes Littéraires du Canada*, Nr. 115
9. Hamacher, W. (2004), Ou, séance, touché de Nancy, in: *S ens en tous sens: Autour des travaux de Jean-Luc Nancy*, Paris: Galilée
10. Lindberg, S. (2021), Four Transcendental Illusions of the Digital World: A Derridian Approach in: *Research in Phenomenology* 51
11. Martinon, J. P. (2007), *On Futurity: Malabou, Nancy, Derrida*, London: Palgrave Macmillan.
12. Nancy, J.L. (2003), *A Finite Thinking*, Stanford: Stanford University Press

14. Malabou, C. (2005), *Future of Hegel*, London: Routledge
15. Malabou, C. (2010), *Plasticity in the Dusk of Writing: Dialectic, Destruction, Deconstruction*, New York: Columbia University Press
16. Malabou, C. (2019), *Morphing Intelligence: From IQ Measurement to Artificial Brains*, New York: Columbia University Press
17. Stiegler, B. (2002), *Echographies of Television*, Oxford: Polity

